The definite account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades--despite never achieving the aims its proponents hope to accomplish--and how it's finally time to forge a new path forward.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has set out to oust governments in the Middle East on an average of once per decade -- in places as diverse as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria. The reasons for these interventions have also been extremely diverse, and the methods by which the United States pursued regime change have also been highly varied: sponsoring a military coup, providing covert or overt military assistance to opposition groups, invading and occupying, invading and not occupying, providing air power to opposition forces, or relying on diplomacy, rhetoric, and sanctions. What is common to all the operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many cases left the countries in question worse off than they were before.
Losing the Long Game is a thorough and riveting look at the U.S. experience with regime change over the past seventy years, and an insider's view on U.S. policymaking in the region at the highest levels.